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Abstract 
This paper considers the choices facing the Asian tiger economies regarding growth 
strategies that foster trans-Pacific rebalancing. A review of historical data spanning 2000 to 
2008 reveals only a slight widening of the overall current account surplus but that there is 
considerable variation across the countries, with Hong Kong, China exhibiting the biggest 
increase in the saving and investment (S-I) balance. Meanwhile, cross-correlation coefficient 
estimates tentatively suggest that changes in the real effective exchange rate do not seem to 
exhibit a consistent negative lead over changes in the S-I gap in the short run over the past 
decade. High import leakage, particularly for the ultra small, open economies of Hong Kong 
and Singapore, calls into question the scope for recalibrating growth drivers towards 
domestic demand. Nonetheless, the implementation of structural policies such as those 
aimed at raising the productivity and wages of workers in the services industry as well as the 
introduction of financial products that alleviates the need for precautionary saving can induce 
domestic consumer demand, especially for the larger economies of Korea and Taipei,China. 
Moreover, the rising affluence and living standards in fast growing regional economies such 
as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) offers the Asian tigers the potential of gearing their 
trade structure in final goods towards markets in the region, thereby aiding the reduction in 
trans-Pacific imbalances.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The recent global economic crisis hit the Asian tiger economies of Hong Kong, China; 
Korea; Singapore; and Taipei,China hard, in spite of their strong macroeconomic 
fundamentals and sound financial systems. Following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, 
these economies had strengthened current accounts and had significant buildups in 
foreign reserves. Meanwhile, their financial systems had become more resilient, with the 
restructuring of balance sheets and the enhancement of surveillance. Nevertheless, 
each tiger economy experienced a collapse in exports and an attendant sharp 
contraction of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the second half of 2008 as global 
demand faltered. The GDP growth rates for Hong Kong, China; Korea; Singapore; and 
Taipei,China hit lows of -7.8%, -4.2%, -9.5% and -10.1%, respectively, in the first quarter 
of 2009. Such developments reflect the small open nature of these economies
1 and 
highlight their vulnerability to external shocks. There were also signs of financial 
contagion in the case of the Republic of Korea (hereafter Korea) which at one juncture 
suffered from currency turmoil. 
Subsequently, towards the end of 2009, the Asian tigers rapidly rebounded, with the 
support of swift domestic policy responses on both the fiscal and monetary fronts. Fiscal 
stimulus measures amounted to around 2.6% of GDP for this group of countries and by 
the first half of 2009, nearly 40% of the fiscal stimulus was implemented (IMF, 2009a). 
Meanwhile, massive policy stimulation in the advanced countries led to the normalization 
of global trade, while pubic support of their financial sectors lifted financial market 
sentiment. The 2010 and 2011 growth projections by IMF (2010) for the Asian tigers as a 
whole stand at 4.8% and 4.7%, respectively. There has also been a resurgence of 
private capital flows into these economies in search of high yielding investments, 
underscoring international investor optimism about the region’s growth prospects. 
Consequently, stock prices and property prices have been trending up amid the flood of 
global liquidity inflows and these developments have started to raise concerns about the 
emergence of asset prices bubbles in these economies. 
By contrast, the recovery in the advanced economies is expected to remain subdued, 
being weighed down by various factors such as high unemployment rates, high public 
debt, difficult financial conditions, and weak household balance sheets. In light of these 
challenges, the advanced economies will probably experience sluggish growth and 
consequently their demand for Asian exports will likely remain subdued in comparison 
with the pre-crisis period. Hence, in order to sustain the ongoing economic recovery, it is 
imperative for the Asian tigers to rely on domestic and regional demand for growth. In 
other words, policymakers in these countries would need to work towards the 
rebalancing of demand from say the United States (US) that has large current account 
deficits in relation to the Asian countries that have big current account surpluses. More 
importantly, such global imbalances are deemed to be unsustainable and may unwind in 
a disorderly manner—involving a sharp fall in the US dollar or a protracted economic 
downturn in the industrialized countries—which would have adverse consequences for 
the world economy, not least the Asian tigers. 
   
                                                  
1 Merchandise exports as a % of GDP for Hong Kong, China; Korea; Singapore; and Taipei,China are 
169%, 45%, 185%, and 65%, respectively. 
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The purpose of this overview paper is to explore the choices faced by the Asian tigers in 
terms of growth strategies that aid global rebalancing. To this end, we examine the 
trends of the imbalances in these economies and consider the prospects of reducing 
such imbalances. The rest of this article is organized as follows: The next section 
investigates the evolution of saving and investment in the Asian tigers over the past 
decade and relates the changes in the magnitude of the S-I gap to exchange rate 
movements. Section 3 discusses the prospect of domestic demand taking on the role of 
a growth driver in these economies, while section 4 focuses on the potential of targeting 
final demand in the regional markets. This is followed by an examination of policy issues 
pertaining to rebalancing the Asian tiger economies in section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
2.  EVOLUTION OF SAVING AND INVESTMENT 
This section examines historical data spanning 2000 to 2008 on the saving and 
investment (S-I) balance at the macroeconomic level for the Asian tiger economies. In 
addition, we present the sectoral composition of saving and investment when such data 
are available. Figure 1 below depicts the trends in overall gross national saving and 
gross investment, while Figure 2 shows the overall current account balance for the 
grouping.
2  
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Source: World Economic Outlook 2009 Database 
 
                                                  
2 The overall ratios or percentages are obtained from the IMF which computes composites of ratios relating 
to the domestic economy weighted by GDP valued at purchasing power parities (PPPs) as a share of 
group GDP. 
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The overall gross national saving rate remained high at an average rate of 31% of GDP 
in the last decade. Such a high level of savings could be attributed to key factors that 
influence long term development in private saving rates such as economic growth, 
demography, and the level of financial uncertainty faced by households (see Loayza et 
al., 2000). Over the same period, overall gross investment hovered around a lower mean 
level of 26% of GDP. Possible explanations for the lower post-Asian crisis level of 
investment include the relocation of production facilities from the Asian tigers to  PRC as 
well as the shift in emphasis from capital intensive production to information technology 
(IT) and knowledge-based economy (IMF, 2005). In any case, both the saving and 
investment rate fell in 2009 by about 3% and 5%, respectively, in the aftermath of the 
global economic crisis. The resulting S-I balance stayed positive throughout the period 
and widened by only 2% of GDP over the past decade. Concomitantly, the current 
account balance climbed from 3.5% of GDP in 2000 to nearly 6% of GDP in 2010 (see 
Figure 2). 
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3d. Taipei,China  
Source: ADB Key Economic Indicators Database 
Do these movements in overall rates mask variations across the countries? In what 
follows, we provide a series of charts that give an overview of the evolution of saving 
and investment in the individual countries. Figure 3 depicts the trends in gross national 
saving and gross domestic investment, while Figure 4 shows the current account 
balance. Each figure (and relevant ones that follow) comprises charts a to d that show 
the corresponding figures for  Hong Kong, China; Korea; Singapore; and Taipei,China, 
respectively. 
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4d. Taipei,China  
Source: IFS Database 
Figures 3b and 3c reveal that the S-I balance first increased and then narrowed over the 
last decade for both Korea and Singapore. In Korea, gross domestic investment 
overtook gross domestic saving, producing a negative current account balance in 2008 
(see Figure 4b). In comparison, the S-I balance for Hong Kong, China and Taipei,China 
broadened between 2000 and 2008. In particular, Hong Kong, China’s S-I gap widened 
considerably from 4% to 14% of its GDP over this period. From the external perspective, 
the charts in Figure 4 show that the current account surplus in Hong Kong, China 
exhibited the most persistent climb over the last decade. 
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Source: b. Bank of Korea; a, c and d. ADB Key Economic Indicators Database 
A better understanding of the determinants of the trends in gross saving and investment 
would require a breakdown of the macroeconomic level data into sectoral level data. 
Unfortunately, published data on the composition of saving and investment in terms of 
government, corporate and household sectors are available only for Korea. While the 
dichotomy between public and private domestic investment is available for the three 
other Asian tigers, there are no official data on public and private saving. To gain a 
tentative indication of the trends in public versus private saving rate, we compute public 
saving as the difference between total government revenue and government 
consumption. Private saving is then estimated as the residual from gross saving. The 
evolution of gross national saving and its various components for the individual 
economies are plotted in Figure 5, while the corresponding charts for investment are 
found in Figure 7. 
We observe from Figures 5a and 5d that gross national saving in Hong Kong, China and 
Taipei,China rose by 3% and 4% of GDP, respectively, over the last decade. While the 
increase in Hong Kong, China was largely driven by public saving which went up by 
more than 2% of GDP, it was private saving which rose by 8% of GDP that led to higher 
gross saving in Taipei,China. By contrast, gross national saving in Korea fell from 33% 
of GDP to 31% of GDP between 2000 and 2007 as household saving more than halved 
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from 9% to 4% (see Figure 5b). Government saving held steady at around 10% of GDP 
while corporate saving increased by 3% of GDP over the same period. As for Singapore, 
there was hardly any change in gross national saving between 2000 and 2008 (see 
Figure 5c). Public saving, which tended to be the driving force of the saving process in 
Singapore, fell by about 6%, but this was completely offset by an increase in private 
saving.  
Figure 6: Corporate and Household Savings for Emerging Asia 
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Source: IMF Regional Economic Outlook October 2009 Database 
A further disaggregation of private saving into household and corporate saving for  Hong 
Kong, China; Singapore; and Taipei,China is hampered by data limitations. Nonetheless, 
IMF staff estimates of household and corporate savings as a % of GDP from 2000 to 
2007 are available for a grouping called “Emerging Asia” which comprises the four Asian 
tigers and some other regional countries, namely India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam (IMF, 2009b). These estimates are plotted in Figure 
6, which shows that household saving climbed by over 3% of GDP while corporate 
saving rose by less than 1% of GDP between 2000 and 2008. The figure suggests that 
in the more recent period neither the corporate sector nor the household sector played a 
dominant role in determining private saving in emerging Asia. The same IMF study 
advocates the strengthening of corporate governance and the deepening of financial 
market development in the regional countries to induce a reduction in corporate savings 
as well as boost consumption, thereby fostering global rebalancing. 
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7d. Taipei,China  
Source: a. Census and Statistics Department,  Hong Kong, China; b. Bank of Korea; c. Ministry of Trade and 
Industry, Singapore; and d. Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistic, Taipei,China 
Turning to investment rates, fluctuations in investment from 2000 to 2008 also differ 
somewhat across the Asian tiger economies (see Figure 7). Gross domestic investment 
exhibited a downward trend over the past decade for Hong Kong, China and 
Taipei,China. The decline in both countries can be attributed to a drop in public 
investment and in the case of Hong Kong, China a slip in private investment as well. By 
contrast, gross domestic investment in Korea held steady over the period and its 
composition remained broadly unchanged from 2000. As for Singapore, the gross 
domestic investment initially slowed and then picked up, despite a continuous decline in 
public investment. Singapore’s high private investment rate is partly due to its 
development strategy of attracting export-oriented foreign firms. 
How do these developments in the S-I balance of the Asian tigers relate to fluctuations in 
the value of their domestic currency? A higher exchange rate value makes local goods 
dearer in foreign currency terms and, at the same time, foreign goods cheaper in 
domestic currency terms. Hence, an appreciation of the domestic currency is expected 
to dampen exports and boost imports, effectively reducing the trade surplus. Since net 
exports form the main component of the current account surplus in these economies, a 
domestic currency appreciation would tend to narrow the positive S-I balance. Is this 
relationship evident in practice? Figure 8 depicts the real effective exchange rate 
superimposed on the S-I balance from 1990 to 2009 for the individual economies. 
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 A visual inspection of the charts suggests an apparent negative association between 
the level of real effective exchange rate and the magnitude of S-I balance. In general, a 
lower level of the real effective exchange rate tends to be associated with a higher level 
in the S-I balance. This negative relationship is particularly evident in the case of Hong 
Kong, China and Singapore, and is discernible for Korea. Figure 8a reveals a persistent 
decline in the Hong Kong, China dollar in real effective terms over the past decade. 
During this period, the S-I balance in Hong Kong, China rose steadily. The real effective 
exchange rate of the Singapore dollar initially fell reaching a trough in 2005 and then 
started to climb as shown in Figure 8c. Interestingly, the magnitude of the S-I balance in 
Singapore seems to mirror these movements in the exchange rate but with a lag. The 
strengthening of the Korean won in real effective terms picked up pace after 2004 
accompanied by a lowering of the S-I balance in the recent period (see Figure 8b). 
Taipei,China is the only exception. We see from Figure 8d that the depreciation in its 
real effective exchange rate does not appear to have a consistent relationship with the 
level of the S-I balance. 
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8d. Taipei,China  
Source: ADB Key Economic Indicators Database and BIS Database 
However, when considering the magnitude of response of the S-I balance to exchange 
rate changes, the relevant relationship to focus on is not between the levels of the 
variables but between the movements in these variables. For a tentative indication of the 
strength of linear association between changes in S-I gap and changes in the real 
effective exchange rate, we examine the cross-correlation coefficients between the first 
differences of the two variables for the individual economies as depicted in Figure 9. 
Firstly, we observe from Figure 9 that the correlation coefficients at leads are in general 
not more significant that those at lags, implying that fluctuations in real effective 
exchange rate do not exhibit a dominant leading relationship over changes in the S-I 
balance in all four economies. Secondly, the correlation coefficients occurring at lead 
time are not predominantly negative. These findings suggest that a depreciation of the 
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real effective exchange rate in the Asian tigers may not necessarily be linked to an 
increment in the S-I balance in the short run.
3  
  Figure 9: Cross-Correlations between Changes in Real Effective Exchange 




























































9d. Taipei,China  
Source: Author’s calculations 
3.  INCREASING RELIANCE ON DOMESTIC DEMAND 
A key component of the trans-Pacific rebalancing strategy is the implementation of 
structural policies that increase domestic demand and the development of non-tradable 
sectors in the regional countries. However, as is well recognized, exports have all along 
played a central role in the growth and development of the Asian tiger economies. In this 
section, we consider the prospect of adopting a new growth model for the Asian tigers 
that leverages more on the domestic economy. To this end, we examine the expenditure 
structure for the characteristics of balance in each country’s growth.  
                                                  
3 We note that these cross-correlation coefficients are preliminary rough estimates as they are computed 
over a small number of time periods. 
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We note at the outset that the size of net exports does not indicate the importance of 
foreign demand relative to domestic demand in an economy, particularly when there is a 
high propensity to import. Each domestic expenditure category, namely private 
consumption (C), government consumption (G) and Investment (I)—which comprises 
fixed capital formation as well as the increase in stocks—has its own import content. 
These import components are not shown separately but are aggregated and included in 
total imports (M) which is in turn subtracted from total exports (X) to produce net exports. 
Therefore, when considering drivers of growth, a better measure of the significance of 
external demand is the magnitude of total exports (rather than net exports) relative to the 
levels of domestic demand components.  
To gauge the relative importance of foreign demand, we rewrite the standard national 
income accounting identity: 
  GDP = C + G + I + X – M    (1) 
as      C + G + I + X = GDP + M    (2) 
The left and right hand sides of equation (2) represent total demand and total supply in 
the economy, respectively. We see from equation (2) that an increase in any of the 
components of total demand could suffer from import leakage. An increase in C, G, I or 
X would not only lead to higher production in that country but also increase production 
elsewhere (as reflected by an increase in imports). While imports in themselves do not 
generate income in an economy, they are necessary to allow the country to export. Of 
course, imports are also critical for restoring external imbalances. 
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Source: a., b. and d. ADB Key Economic Indicators Database; c. Minsitry of Trade and Industry, Singapore. 
The relative shares of the components of total demand for the Asian tigers are shown in 
Figure 10. The figures imply that these economies are highly dependent on export 
demand and that the reliance on foreign demand has grown over the past decade in all 
four countries. In 2008, external demand accounts for 70%, 29%, 76%, and 45%, 
respectively, of total demand in Hong Kong, China; Korea; Singapore; and Taipei,China, 
respectively. In the case of Hong Kong, China and Singapore, external demand 
dominates domestic demand because re-exports account for a significant portion of their 
total exports, exceeding 90% and 30%, respectively. 
The extent to which the drivers of growth can be recalibrated depends on, amongst other 
things, the leverage each demand component exerts on output growth. For small open 
economies, a 1% increase in external demand is likely to have a greater impact on GDP 
than a corresponding 1% increase in say private consumption. After all, an exogenous 
increase in export demand will not only raise GDP in the current time period, but will also 
have second round effects of inducing growth in the domestic demand components in 
future time periods. Moreover, as explained earlier, an increase in any component of 
domestic demand in such economies would tend to suffer from high import leakage. 
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Osada (1998) provides estimates of the marginal propensity to import for Hong Kong, 
China; Korea; Singapore; and Taipei,China of 3.1, 0.4, 1.5, and 0.6, respectively.
4  
Figure 11 depicts the annual % change of total demand and its components. We 
observe from this figure that, with the exception of Korea, fluctuations in GDP growth are 
closely associated with changes in external demand rather than changes in domestic 
demand. For instance, the dip in domestic demand growth in Hong Kong, China in 2005 
did not make a significant dent on its GDP growth in that year (see Figure 11a). 
Similarly, it is clear from Figure 11c that the upsurge in domestic demand in 2008 in 
Singapore—that is largely due to a jump in government consumption—did not seem to 
have any discernible effect on its GDP growth in that year. In sharp contrast, Figure 11b 
reveals that movements in GDP growth in Korea do not closely follow the fluctuations in 
external demand but are significantly influenced by developments in domestic demand. 
As for Taipei,China, there is insufficient deviation in the pattern of fluctuations between 
domestic demand and external demand, so that we are unable to distinguish which is 
dominating GDP growth  
These findings are not in the least surprising when we consider the population size of 
the two city states Hong Kong, China and Singapore, which are only 7 million and 4.8 
million in 2008, respectively. In other words, added to the problem of high import 
leakage, domestic demand in both these economies lacks the scale to drive output 
growth. These observations seem to attest to the fact that a domestic-led growth model 
is clearly unsuited for ultra small open economies like Hong Kong, China and Singapore. 
In comparison, the population size in 2008 of Korea and Taipei,China is 48.6 million and 
23 million, respectively. Hence, there appears to be more room for policy maneuvering 
with regard to increasing reliance on domestic demand in the two larger economies of 
Korea and Taipei,China. 
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4 The marginal propensity to import exceeds unity for Hong Kong, China and Singapore due to the high 
proportion of re-exports. The propensity to import goods for domestic production or consumption in 
Singapore is estimated to be around 0.8 (Peebles and Wilson, 2002), while the propensity to import in 
Hong Kong, China calculated from retained imports using more recent data is approximately 0.5. 
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11d. Taipei,China  
Source: a., b. and d. ADB Key Economic Indicators Database; c. Minsitry of Trade and Industry, Singapore.  
While external demand will in all likelihood continue to be significant, domestic demand 
could over time play a more dynamic role in the Asian tiger economies. In particular, 
household consumption in these economies is likely to increase along with the projected 
shifts in their demographic profiles. With reference to the life cycle hypothesis, an ageing 
population tends to put downward pressures on the saving rate as there is a tendency 
for the elderly to consume out of savings upon retirement. The findings of an IMF study 
(IMF, 2005) that uses panel regression analysis confirm that the old age dependency 
ratio—which is the ratio of those aged 65 and over to the population aged 15–64—is 
negatively associated with savings. In the study, each percentage point increase in the 
elderly dependency ratio is estimated to raise consumption by 3 percentage points of 
GDP, suggesting life cycle factors do have a significant effect on the savings rate. 
Figure 12 depicts the past and projected old age dependency ratio for the Asian Tigers. 
We observe that, without exception, the elderly dependency ratio has been going up and 
is likely to climb further.
5 The hitherto high saving rate in these countries could partly be 
attributed to higher household saving as people prepare for retirement. Hence, we infer 
that ongoing changes in the age composition of the population in these countries are 
likely to increase the consumption to GDP ratio notwithstanding bequest motives. 
However, such adjustments are likely to be gradual as shifts in demographic profiles 
occur only slowly (Eichengreen, 2006). 
                                                  
5  Demographic change in Singapore was supposed to produce one of the world’s most rapidly aging 
populations. However, the transition towards an older population structure was slowed by large scale 
immigration and importation of foreign talents and workers.  
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Figure 12: Elderly Dependency Ratio (% of total Population)
 6 
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4.  TARGETING FINAL DEMAND IN REGIONAL 
MARKETS 
As argued in the previous section, the small size of the Asian tiger economies dictates 
that they remain open and reliant on foreign demand. In fact, the export-led growth 
strategy adopted by these economies had for decades proved highly successful in 
delivering strong output growth, notwithstanding greater volatility in GDP growth rates.
7 
The challenge faced by policymakers in these countries is to dampen the business cycle 
fluctuations that were accentuated by recurrent shocks from the external environment. A 
key way to increase the resilience of an economy against exogenous shocks is through 
the diversification of its export markets. In fact, the Asian tigers had long diversified their 
trading partners, as reflected by the myriad of free trade agreements that they had 
entered into. 
In particular, the Asian tigers had steadily increased trade with regional partners over the 
past decade. This is evident from Figure 13, which depicts the intraregional trade of the 
individual economy as a percentage of its total trade. It is well recognized that the 
increase in intraregional trade in Asia had been spurred by the global integration of 
PRC’s economy.  
                                                  
6 Data for Hong Kong, China; Korea; and Singapore are sourced from Population Division of the Department 
of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2008 
Revision. Due to unavailability of data for Taipei,China, we compute the old age dependency ratios from 
1980 to 2009 based on data from the CEIC database.  
7 The volatile GDP growth rates over the past decade led the local media to dub Singapore a roller-coaster 
economy.  
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Source: Asian Development Outlook (2009) Update 
 
Table 1 shows, for each Asian tiger, the six most important trading partners based on 
bilateral exports trade data as well as the share of total exports they each account for in 
1990 and 2008. We observe from the table that, without exception, the regional 
economies, particularly PRC, gained importance as trading partners of the Asian tigers. 
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Table 1: Key Export Markets of Individual Economies 
 1990  2008 
      %      % 
 Hong Kong, China      PRC  25       PRC  51
     United States  24      United States  11
     Germany  6      Japan  4
     Japan  6      Germany  3
     United Kingdom  4      United Kingdom  2
     Singapore  3      Singapore  2
Korea     United States  29       PRC  25
     Japan  19      United States  11
      Hong Kong, China  6      Japan  6
     Germany  4      Singapore  4
     Singapore  3       Hong Kong, China  4
     United Kingdom  3      Germany  3
Singapore     United States  21      Malaysia  13
     Malaysia  13      Indonesia  11
     Japan  9       Hong Kong, China  11
     Thailand  7       PRC  9
      Hong Kong, China  6      United States  7
     Australia  2      Japan  4
Taipei,China     United States  32       Hong Kong, China  13
      Hong Kong, China  13      United States  12
     Japan  12      Japan  7
     Germany  5      Singapore  5
     Singapore  3      Korea  3
    United Kingdom  3      Germany  2
 
Source: ADB Key Economic Indicators Database 
However, the rise in intraregional trade can in large part be attributed to the growing 
intensity in vertical intra-industry trade in Asia. The Asian tigers are well integrated in the 
regional production networks which had been strengthened by the emergence of PRC 
as a manufacturing powerhouse. Specifically, these economies supply high value 
intermediate components to PRC for further processing and final assembly. The export 
profiles of Korea; Singapore; and Taipei,China are similar—their export baskets weigh 
heavily on electronics components such as semiconductors and printed circuit boards 
bound for PRC, the information technology assembly hub. In other words, trade flows 
with the regional countries is dominated by trade in parts and components rather than 
trade in final products.  
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Due to the emergence of production networks, trade statistics no longer accurately 
reflect the dependence of Asian countries on extra-regional demand. Pula and Peltonen 
(2009) used an updated Asian input-output table to show that Asia has not decoupled 
from the rest of the world.
8 In fact, a study by ADB (2007) estimated that approximately 
only a third of the final demand composition of Asia’s exports in 2006 can be accounted 
for by the region. Hence, it is not surprising that the recent collapse in demand of the 
end markets was transmitted to these countries involved in the different stages of the 
production process, resulting in the synchronized fall in trade. Not unlike the other Asian 
economies, the Asian tigers are still heavily dependent on the US and Euro area 
markets in terms of final demand. Consequently, the economic prospect of the Asian 
tigers remains coupled to the upswings and downturns in the developed markets. 
To reduce the vulnerability of export growth to demand shocks from the extra-regional 
markets, the Asian tigers need to gear their trade structure in terms of trade in final 
goods away from excessive dependence on the US and Euro zone markets towards 
regional markets. The aim would be to have intraregional trade based on trade in final 
products as an additional source of demand and growth for these economies. This 
means that intraregional trade should also be driven by consumption rather than by 
production alone. In this regard, the level of private consumption in Asia is likely to 
increase in view of rising affluence and standards of living in the fast growing regional 
economies. In particular, PRC offers some potential as a strong source of independent 
demand in view of the emergence of its large middle class with growing purchasing 
power. 
                                                  
8 The same study found that Asia’s exports only account for approximately one-third of its GDP, far below 
the 50% dependence indicated by trade data. The exaggerated export dependence is due to the higher 
import content of exports that resulted from greater segmentation of the production process across the 
region. 
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Figure 14: Composition of China’s Trade Balance with Individual Economies in 
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Source: Asian Development Outlook 2009 Update 
A recent ADB study (ADB, 2009) provides evidence that domestic demand in  PRC is 
already starting to play a more prominent role in supporting exports from the Asian 
tigers. Figure 14 shows the composition of trade balance evolving over time between 
PRC and the individual economies. In the study total trade balance is decomposed into 
four major categories namely: basic products; construction materials; parts and 
components; and final goods. Since the figures for the first two categories are relatively 
small for the countries under consideration, we focus only on the last two categories in 
our analysis. 
Figure 14a reveals that PRC has been running current account surpluses with Hong 
Kong, China. This is not surprising given Hong Kong, China’s role as a major 
transshipment centre for PRC’s exports. Although PRC also runs a trade surplus in final 
goods with Singapore, the magnitude is much smaller than the level of trade balance 
with the other three countries (see Figure 14c). By contrast, we see from Figures 14b 
and 14d that PRC has been running current account deficits with Korea and 
Taipei,China. Moreover, final goods are accounting for a growing share of PRC’s trade 
deficit with these two countries over time. The magnitude of these deficits are 
significantly higher for Taipei,China, reflecting its cross-strait trade integration with PRC. 
Considering the probable shifts in PRC towards a bigger consumption basket that is 
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typical in a rapidly growing economy, trade in final goods would likely play a more 
important role in driving the increase in trade between PRC and the Asian tigers going 
forward. 
5.  POLICY ISSUES PERTAINING TO REBALANCING   
This section identifies policy options the Asian tigers need to adopt to realize the process 
of rebalancing their economies. It is important to note at the outset that boosting 
domestic demand through structural reforms in these economies would not necessarily 
require abandoning the export-led growth strategy or turning back from economic 
openness. Rather, it is a policy imperative for the Asian tigers to remain open to trade 
and capital flows for the following reasons: Firstly, exports and output often mutually 
reinforce each other. For instance, exports are known to enhance long-run growth 
potential by accelerating the process of human capital accumulation which in turn fosters 
growth (see Chuang, 1998). Secondly, with reference to endogenous growth models, 
imports also tend to have a positive impact on labor productivity. It is well recognized 
that imports act as an important channel for foreign technology and knowledge 
(Grossman and Helpman, 1991). Thirdly, retaining a degree of openness would 
encourage foreign direct investment inflows that contribute to domestic economic growth 
through channels such as the injection of greater competitive forces, the introduction of 
managerial innovations, and the restructuring of underperforming firms.
9 
Notwithstanding the need to remain integrated with the world economy, it is in the 
interest of the Asian tigers to increase their resilience against a possibly protracted 
period of subdued global demand conditions. After all, the unwinding of the huge global 
imbalances will likely require a prolonged period of adjustment to the global structure of 
supply and demand. The resolution of the imbalances does not imply the Asian tigers 
should all attempt to achieve balanced current accounts. Rather, what is required are 
policies that facilitate a more balanced structure of demand and growth within the 
economies. Given the mismatch between what the Asian tigers produce and what they 
consume, such rebalancing will require major adjustments to their underlying economic 
structure. The rebalancing of growth towards domestic demand will thus be a complex 
structural process that is not only difficult but also time consuming (Adams and Park, 
2009). Nevertheless, there is scope for policy adjustments in the Asian tigers in view of 
their strong economic fundamentals, fiscal latitude and sound financial systems. 
Furthermore, as pointed out by Li (2002), the erstwhile largely complementary economic 
relationship between the Asian tigers and PRC—in the form of the former supplying 
capital while the latter providing cheap labour—is likely to evolve into a more competitive 
relationship in the future as PRC moves up the value chain and progresses to higher 
value-added industries. This suggests the Asian tigers would also need to identify new 
areas of comparative advantage as well as seek out new areas of complementarities, 
especially those that would help them reduce their reliance on extra-regional demand. 
As the income level in PRC rises, there is a growing culture of consumerism with shifts 
in spending patterns leading to higher consumption of luxury goods and services. For 
instance, strong demand from PRC has been driving the recent recovery in the retail of 
branded watches and jewelry, while tourist arrivals in the Asian tigers from PRC have 
been growing rapidly (He et al. 2007). In fact, this shift towards consumption whereby 
                                                  
9 See OECD (2002) for a literature review of empirical studies that show the positive impact of foreign direct 
investment on economic growth. 
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goods and services that had previously been regarded as luxuries are now viewed as 
necessities is also evident amongst the young urban generation in many traditionally 
thrifty societies in the region. The Asian tigers should continue to position themselves to 
capitalize on such ongoing increases in intra-regional demand by re-orientating their 
economic structures in such a way that taps into the changing spending patterns of 
prospering Asian countries. 
In this regard, the Asian tigers could maintain their dynamic and niche-based 
competitiveness by focusing on services exports particularly through building up ancillary 
capabilities. Services sector productivity in Hong Kong, China; Korea; Singapore; and 
Taipei,China stand at approximately 84, 27, 58 and 53, respectively, on a scale of 1 to 
100, where 100 represents the productivity level in the US services sector. This 
suggests there is ample room for further developing the services industry and there is a  
need to eradicate existing policy distortions that favor the manufacturing industry. 
Regulatory reforms in the services sector of the Asian tigers would not only boost 
productivity in this sector but also generate large gains in overall economic growth. 
Policy initiatives such as funding the upgrading of workers’ skills and expertise would 
result in a more knowledgeable and experienced workforce that would enhance the 
quality of services. Moreover, policies that induce firms to innovate their work processes 
and incorporate the use of technology would lead to the improvement of work practices. 
Business investments targeting higher valued-added exportable services industries such 
as financial services, medical tourism, and tertiary education should also be encouraged, 
perhaps by offering tax breaks and incentives for regional expansion.  
Apart from tradable services, service sector companies in the Asian tigers that provide 
lower-value home-grown services such as retail; food and beverages; and personal 
grooming should also be granted greater tax incentives and a reduction in start-up costs. 
These industries are important for the stimulation of local consumption as they generate 
employment and income for the majority of the unskilled population. It follows that the 
long held bias in favour of the production of tradables over non-tradables in these 
economies has to be reduced to bring about an increase in domestic consumer 
demand.
10 
Meanwhile, demand side policies for reducing the mismatch between output and 
demand structures should aim to narrow the income gap or at least arrest any further 
worsening of the income distribution.
11 In particular, wage levels at the lower end of the 
income scale should be raised to alleviate the financial insecurity felt by local residents. 
Of course, this should be matched by an increase in their productivity such as through 
retraining efforts. For instance, in the case of Singapore, the authorities have begun to 
slow the upsurge of low skilled migrant workers as their hitherto easy availability 
removes the incentives for companies to upgrade and places downward pressure on 
wages of the lower skilled domestic workforce. 
A rise in household consumption brought about by a reduction in precautionary saving 
could also be induced through further development of the financial markets in Asian tiger 
economies. For instance, a wider array of financial products could be offered to provide 
investment opportunities that give better rates of return. The provision of high yielding 
                                                  
10  However, we are not advocating that the Asian tigers adopt a new growth model whereby domestic 
demand consistently grows faster than output, as this would in the long term lead to unsustainably large 
trade deficits. 
11 According to a study by IMF (2006b), the Gini coefficient for Hong Kong, China; Korea; Singapore; and 
Taipei,China climbed 51.4, 33.1, 48.1, and 33.9 points, respectively, from 1995 to 2005. 
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saving vehicles would help raise household incomes. Moreover, the introduction of 
annuity products, health insurance schemes, and education financial assistance 
programs would help ease the requisite level of saving for retirement, medical, and 
education purposes. Nevertheless, we note that in response to financial sector reforms 
in the aftermath of the Asian crisis, consumer credit expanded very rapidly—particularly 
in Korea and to a lesser extend in Taipei,China—leading to a jump in household 
delinquencies and nonperforming loans (IMF, 2006a). Hence, it is vital for the 
supervisory authorities to keep pace with new developments in the financial markets and 
impose regulatory curbs on excessive consumer lending to ensure financial stability.   
The aforementioned policy recommendations apply in general to all the Asian tigers. 
However, those targeted at boosting domestic demand should be implemented to a 
greater extent in Korea and Taipei,China. As noted in the earlier section, these larger 
economies have more scope than the small economies of  Hong Kong, China and 
Singapore to increase their reliance on domestic demand. We now turn our attention to 
Taipei,China. 
The Taipei,China economy, which grew at a rapid 9.2% year-on-year in the fourth 
quarter of 2009, has not only returned to pre-crisis growth levels but also outperformed 
the other three Asian tigers, whose corresponding growth figures are 2.6%, 6%, and 
3.5% for Hong Kong, China; Korea’ and Singapore, respectively.
12 Interestingly, PRC 
featured prominently in the rapid recovery of Taipei,China, even as exports of final 
goods to PRC increased from 17.8% of total exports at the start of 2009 to 29.2% in 
January 2010. As shown in Figure 14d in the previous section, exports for final 
consumption in PRC have been accounting for a growing share of PRC’s trade deficit 
with Taipei,China over time. This reflects the increased penetration of Taipei,China’s 
goods in PRC’s markets. Indeed, economic linkages between these two countries have 
proliferated since the 1990s. 
13 However, official figures tend to underestimate trade and 
investment flows between them due to various cross-border restrictions and political 
reasons. Taipei,China’s trade with and investment in mainland PRC have all along been 
partly intermediated through third parties such as Hong Kong, China; Japan; and 
Singapore. For that matter, Hong Kong, China also serves as a key intermediary to the 
rest of the world for PRC’s external trade via re-exports and offshore trade, as well as for 
raising international capital in the form of foreign direct investment, equity and bond 
financing and syndicated loans to finance PRC’s economic boom. 
Cheung  et al. (2003) assessed the degree of real and financial integration between 
Taipei,China and mainland PRC (as well as Hong Kong, China) by testing for real 
interest rate parity, uncovered interest rate parity, and real purchasing power parity. The 
authors found that these three parity conditions do hold over the long term, thereby 
providing empirical evidence of real and financial capital mobility as well as goods 
market integration between the Taipei,China and PRC, notwithstanding the presence of 
various forms trade barriers and capital controls. As these impediments continue to be 
lifted, Taipei,China will gain economically through further integrating its economy with 
PRC. Wang (2003) used a computable general equilibrium model to show the positive 
effects of a free trade area in the “Greater China” region, comprising mainland PRC, 
Hong Kong, China and Taipei,China. Furthermore, Zhang and Sato (2007) found 
increasing structural symmetry amongst these three economies that raises the potential 
                                                  
12 All the year-on-year growth rate figures are flattered by a low base effect. 
13 See  Zhang  et al. (2003) for a discussion of these linkages from a dynamic economic and political 
perspective.  
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of the region to become a candidate for monetary union. Taipei,China is likely to 
continue intensifying its economic integration with mainland PRC which will 
concomitantly reduce its dependence on extra-regional markets, consequently aiding in 
global rebalancing.  
In a similar vein, a way forward to advance trans-Pacific rebalancing is to establish a 
common market within the region over the long term as this will raise intra-Asian 
demand and investment (Kawai, 2009). Combining markets in the region could prove an 
effective strategy given the Asian economies, with few exceptions, do not individually 
have the scale to transit from externally-driven to internally-driven growth. The market 
enlargement would also induce growth through greater competition amongst firms that 
will lead to productivity gains, and through efficiency gains for the consumers (both final 
and intermediate) by an increase in the range of product choice. Drawing on the 
European experience with the 1992 European Single Market Programme, measures that 
would need to taken include the adoption of a trade liberalization programme;
14 lowering 
barriers to cross border public procurement; enforcement of competition policy in all 
sectors; and eliminating hindrances to free movement of labor, capital and services 
across member countries. Clearly, many hurdles to embarking on these initiatives such 
as historical legacy issues, territorial disputes, structural and institutional heterogeneity 
and economic diversity exist. Nonetheless, the probable muted recovery in the advanced 
industrialized countries might just provide the necessary impetus to overcome the 
political, economic and institutional challenges and accelerate efforts to establish a 
common market within Asia. 
6.  CONCLUSION 
In summary, overall gross national saving in the Asian tiger economies remained higher 
than overall gross investment and the S-I balance for the grouping widened only slightly 
over the past decade. As for the individual countries, the S-I gap in Hong Kong, China 
and Taipei,China widened steadily. While the increase in gross saving in Hong Kong, 
China was driven by the public sector, it was private saving that boosted gross saving for 
Taipei,China. Public investment slipped in both countries and private investment fell in 
Hong Kong, China as well. Meanwhile, the increase in S-I balance for Korea and 
Singapore reversed somewhat from 2006, with a pickup in gross investment. When the 
trend in the real effective exchange rate is superimposed on the S-I balance, a negative 
association is discernible between the levels of the two variables. However, cross-
correlation coefficients suggest a depreciation in the real effective exchange rate in the 
Asian tigers may not necessarily be linked to a future increment in the S-I balance in the 
short run. 
Although a key component of the rebalancing strategy is the implementation of structural 
policies that reduce the reliance on external demand, a new growth model that leverages 
more on the domestic economy is not suited for the small open economies of Hong 
Kong, China and Singapore. The high propensity to import in these countries limits the 
leverage that domestic demand components have on output growth and thereby, 
reduces the scope for them to become drivers of growth. In other words, the small size 
of these economies dictates that they remain open and reliant on foreign demand. 
Nonetheless, the authorities of the Asian tigers, particularly the larger economies of 
                                                  
14 At the current juncture, China, Japan and Korea have each arranged FTA agreements with the 
whole of ASEAN; the proposal here is to merge these bilateral FTAs into a region-wide FTA.  
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Korea and Taipei,China, should use domestic polices such as those aimed at raising the 
productivity and wages of workers in the services industry as well as the introduction of 
financial products that alleviate the need for precautionary saving to boost domestic 
consumer demand. 
Nevertheless, it is crucial for all the Asian tiger economies to retain their openness and 
international orientation. Trans-Pacific rebalancing could also be fostered by gearing the 
trade structure of the Asian tigers in terms of trade in final goods towards regional 
markets. The rising affluence and living standards in the fast growing regional 
economies such as PRC offer potential as a strong source of independent end demand 
from within the region. In fact, the economic integration of “Greater China” economies of 
PRC; Hong Kong, China; and Taipei,China is already taking place and is likely to 
intensify. Indeed, the Asian countries should make greater efforts to advance the 
establishment of a common market to position themselves well to benefit from the 
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